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Guest Editor's Introduction

PUTTING THE GOVERNANCE OF AFRICAN
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES UNDER THE RULE
OF LAW
James C. N. Paul*
This volume is not intended as just one more chronicle of the
human rights abuses of the police and military in Sub Saharan African
countries. An endless number of valuable but depressing nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports treat with that subject.
Rather this volume falls within the genre of constitutional law in
the broad sense of that term. It is intended as a contribution to the
study of the legal structure and governance of the police, military and
other organizations in African countries (such as secret surveillance
units) which exercise "police powers" (i.e. powers to use force against
citizens, to detain and interrogate, to arrest, to search for and seize
evidence, and to administer imprisonment).' The focal concepts "legal structure" and "governance" - are defined more fully below.
They point attention to the need to analyze the norms and processes
which are supposed to control the creation and management of these
very important governmental organs and to require their accountability
to the principles of the constitution and the law.
Very little attention has been paid to this subject and this gap in
knowledge seems surprising in view of the deplorable, lawless roles
played by the police and military in the political and constitutional
development of so many African countries.

" William J. Brennan Professor of Law (Emeritus), Rutgers The State University
of New Jersey;
Trustee and Secretary, International Center for Law in Development (New York). I wish to record my
deep appreciation for the help of Ms. Helene Wright, of the Rutgers Law School staff, for her help in
preparing this paper, and others in this volume, for publication.
'Of course there are significant differences between the police and the army, although these become

increasingly obscure when one examines the paramilitary police and the special units of the army

discussed in papers in this volume. In most states at least some units of the army have often been used to
exercise the police powers noted above. In apartheid South Africa the distinctions were particularly
blurred. International human rights law makes no distinction as to who exercises police powers when it
comes to the duty to protect the rights guaranteed, nor do other United Nations human rights instruments.

Indeed, in view of the extensive use of armies in Africa as internalsecurity forces, as well as the extensive
history of military rule in the African context, it seems particularly important to put the governance of the
military under a new, more rigorous rule of law. '
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The papers published here were among those presented at an
INTWORLSA-organized seminar held in Addis Ababa in 1995. As
described more fully in Professor An-N'aim's Report (which follows),
the Addis seminar was composed of representatives from thirteen
human rights NGOs in seven African countries. They contributed
reports which examined the structure and system of governance of
internal security forces (ISFs) (notably the police) in their respective
countries. They were also invited to discuss the need for an
international (or regional), Code of Universal Principles to guide
efforts to reconstitute them and, to facilitate
this deliberation, a draft of
2
such a code was circulated in advance.
This introduction sets out:
(1) A more detailed description of the INTWORLSA project
which generated the Addis seminar;
(2) Some observations generated by the Addis seminar and other
literature on African ISFs;
(3) Some observations on the importance of creating a new body
of law for the governance of ISFs.
The last point - particularly the need for an international code of
universal principles addressing this subject - is examined in more
detail in the concluding paper of this volume.
I.

3
A DESCRIPTION OF INTWORLSA's PROJECT:

INTWORLSA's project on Human Rights and the Structure and
Governance of ISF grew out of an earlier undertaking - a series of
international workshops on "Building Democratic Constitutional
Orders in SubSaharan Africa."
In those meetings a great deal of attention was focused on
strategies to develop more effective processes and institutions to
promote the democratization of governance, rule of law and promotion
of human rights, e.g. the need to establish: independent, accessible
and adequately empowered judiciaries, legislatures and human rights
2This code was first published in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES - 1990: Police Security and Human
Rights in the Third World at p. 237. That volume, too, contains valuable country studies of the structure
of ISF in African (and other) countries.
3 The text in this section is an edited version of the description sent to the participants in the Addis
Ababa seminar.
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commissions; agencies to secure free and fair elections; broad-based
political parties structured to provide more meaningful popular
participation in the political processes; and institutions and processes
to strengthen civil society's capacities to impose accountability on
rulers. In pondering these needs, it became clear, too, that much more
attention should be paid to the problem (urgent in many countries in
light of continuing experience) of reconstituting the internal security
forces (ISF's) of the state: the police, the prison administrators, the
secret intelligence agencies and the military wherever and whenever
soldiers are extensively used for internal police functions and exercise
of police powers. 4
The present project grew out of those concerns. It focuses on the
law which structures and provides for the governance of ISFs, that is,
that rather amorphous body of rules found in the constitution, and
legislation of countries (e.g. the organic acts establishing the police;
the criminal procedure code), and the internal law of ISFs (such as
regulations, standing orders, manuals, etc.) which cumulatively
provides for:
-the plenary legislative power to create (or authorize creation),
finance, empower, and establish the responsibilities of all ISFs units,
and the power to abolish or restructure each;
-a clear definition of the mission and duties of each unit,
emphasizing the overriding duty of all ISFs to protect and support the
existing constitutional order and respect all laws enacted pursuant to it;
-the continuing control and oversight of all ISFs by the legislature
and courts, and by the chief executive subordinate to their powers, and
by other civil institutions of government established by law (such as
Human Rights Commissions);
-the recruitment and composition (e.g. in terms of gender,
geography and ethnicity) and the training and professional orientation
of all ISF personnel;
-codes of conduct, applicable to all ranks of ISFs, which prescribe
duties to provide scrupulous protection of all guaranteed human rights
and the rule of law, and which provide for the discipline, including
4 See THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDiEs 1988: Building ConstitutionalOrders in SubSaharan Africa,
(and in particular the thematic report by James Paul); THIRD WORLD LEGAL STuDIES 1990, Human Rights
and the Structure of Police and Internal Security Forces. (Coordinator's Introduction.)
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criminal punishment
of those who violate the code or sanction
violations or (in the case of commanders) who negligently fail to
detect and prevent or punish violations;
-the accountability of all commanders of all units, and of the
agency as a whole, to all laws governing the management of ISFs, and
their liability for a unit's failure to adhere to prescribed standards of
conduct;
-transparency, including laws requiring the keeping of accessible
records and full disclosure to any interested person of information
regarding detentions, charges, treatment of prisoners and disclosure of
all other categories of information prescribed by law;
-effective remedies (administrative, civil, and criminal) for victims
of all violations of the Code and other laws governing ISF operations;
-the adequate empowerment of civil government organs (including
legislatures, courts, human rights commissions and other designated
bodies) to investigate ISF activities and enforce this accountability;
-recognition and protection of the rights of organs of civil society
(e.g. the press, NGOs) to monitor ISFs, and demand continuing
compliance with all these provisions, and to apply to the courts or
other agencies for remedies to redress systemic violations of standards
prescribed by the Code of Conduct or other laws.
These are only suggestive elements of a legal structure designed to
put ISFs under a rule of law geared to democratic governance and
respect for human rights. These elements deserve the attention of
Constitution-makers and legislators and concerned civil society groups
seeking to create a constitutional order that establishes democratic
participation in all basic spheres of governance, human rights and the
rule of law as interdependent goals. 5
Several further hypotheses elaborated the project:
(1) In many countries (in all parts of the world) there are gaps in
the law - and often no provisions of law - governing the
structure of ISFs in respect to most, if not all of the concerns
listed above. Further, much of the law structuring ISFs is law
characterized by immense, unbounded delegations of
s A more detailed listing of the elements of an appropriate structure is appended to Abdullai AnNa'im's Report, infra. That list was sent to each participant in the Addis Seminar to guide preparation of

the country reports.
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discretionary power to the executive which have the effect of
immunizing these organs from civil control. Hence ISFs are, to
a significant extent, ungoverned by law; they are "lawless"
organs of government.
(2) The existence of "lawless" legal structures contributes to wellknown, widely documented systemic patterns of abuse of basic
rights, the violent repression of civil society, discriminations
against women, ethnic groups and the poor and vulnerable, and
to corruption and the subversion of good governance and to
poverty and maldevelopment - and sometimes to the
breakdown of the state and anarchical conditions.
(3) If these and other harmful consequences are to be avoided, and
in any event if democratization and respect for rights are goals
of the constitutional order, then there is a need to put ISFs
under a more rigorous rule of law which attends to the
elements of structure noted above.
(4) Towards that end, it is important to establish an authoritative
body of basic principles which can provide the framework for
constitutional and legislative provisions creating the desired
rule of law;
(5) The draft "Code of Universal Principles" (reproduced in this
volume) is intended to respond to this need. Its provisions,
drawn from existing international law, are designed to apply
universally accepted standards of governance to all agencies of
a state which exercise police powers.
Of course the above assumptions need to be examined, and that is
the task of the INTWORLSA project. Country studies are needed
which analyze both the existing law and, especially, the absence of law
structuring ISFs. The legal immunity and autonomy of ISFs - the
absence of law, imposing strict accountability to constitutional
principles, to other organs of government and to civil society - can be
documented, and the human rights and other political and economic
consequences of these gaps in the law can be estimated in a more
informed way.
A further objective is to encourage the process of formulating a
comprehensive body of interrelated principles (drawn from
international human rights law) which should be used to frame
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constitutional principles and other laws to restructure ISFs. The hope
is that the draft in "Code of Universal Principles" (reproduced in this
volume) would lead to further, more informed, efforts to formulate a
more nuanced Code of "universal principles" geared to the concerns
reflected by the country studies - and then to efforts to convince
international human rights organizations of the need for such a code,
and to international efforts to press for this result.
II.

SOME THEMES SUGGESTED BY THE ADDIS ABABA SEMINAR
REPORTS AND OTHER LITERATURE

The existing literature on ISFs pays very little attention to the
elements of structure and governance noted above. As several
scholars of the police have noted: apart from extensive documentation
of abuses, "very little is known about the police in Africa." 6 While
there is a large literature on "the military," much of it is devoted to
theorizing about the political behavior of the armies examined, and
this scholarship seems quite soft when it comes to depicting norms
relating to the management and governance of the armies examined.7
The result, as one masterful survey concludes, is a striking paucity
and superficiality when it comes to studies which focus on "ways of
bringing the states repressive apparatuses ... under effective
democratic and not just civilian control."8
The emphasis, above, on "democratic control" is important from
both normative and historical perspectives. The Universal Declaration
states 9 that the will of the people, manifested through continuing
exercise of all rights of political participation (not just elections), and
respect for all universal rights, must be the sole basis of the authority
of government including the authority and accountability of all ISFs.
6 See Alice Hills, Towards a Critique of Policing and National Development in Africa, 34 J.
MODERN AFRICAN STUD., 271 (1996) quoting Otwin Marenin, Policing African States: Towards a
Critique, COMPARATIVE POLITICS 395 (1982). Hills' article is an interesting survey of the literature. For
an informative article on the structure of the Ugandan police in the 1960s, and on the need for new
constitutional provisions to provide for the independence of the police from executive and political
control, see Daniel Ntanda Nsereko, The Police, Human Rights and the Constitution: An African
Perspective, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 465 (1993).
7 Robin Luckham, The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of
Literatureand Issues, 37 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEw 13 (1994).
8Id. at 65.
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 27.
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Further, experience throughout Africa suggests that civilian control
(i.e., control by an elected chief executive) has never been equivalent
to democratic control, nor to a rights-sensitive, rule-of-law control.
Yet prominent scholars continue to ignore this experience, and they
continue to tell us that civilian control is the dominant objective, and,
if given proper professional training (an undefined concept) and
adequate resources and pay, ISFs will leave politics alone.' 0 History
suggests that this is a gross simplification of a most serious problem.
A. Historical themes
From their origins in the making of colonial states into the
beginnings of post-colonial states, ISFs in Africa were organized as
rather autonomous units of governance under the "control" of civilian
chief executives - e.g. the Governor General in colonial times. Indeed,
colonial police and paramilitary forces were small, but in many ways
quite professional organizations; they were created and commanded by
seasoned colonial civil servants under the control of the Governor
General - usually a civilian official. Discipline was strict, and their
efficiency in enforcing their primary mission - maintaining the security
of the colonial regime - was notable. Thus, enforcement of the ruler's
commands defined the central purpose, and characterized the training
and indoctrination, of these forces. 1
As shown by papers herein (and other studies), during the process
of framing independence constitutions very little, if any, attention was
focused on any need to redefine the mission, size, composition,
training and accountability of these security organs of the new state. It
seems to have been assumed that the duly elected chief executive of an
independent state would assure the political neutrality and lawful
behavior of these erstwhile instruments of authoritarian colonial rule.
Indeed, prominent political theorists stressed the importance of
having a professional police and army at the disposition of the leaders
of the new, post-colonial governments; the ability of ISFs to impose
political order was said to be of paramount importance in view of the
1oSee e.g. Samuel Huntington, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (1991); Huntington, Reforming Civil-Military Relations, 6 J. OF DEMOCRACY 9 (1995).
11The colonial legacies are emphasized in country studies which follow, and in similar studies in
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIEs - 1990, supra note 2. See also Luckham, note 7 supra.
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assumed fragility of these states.' 2 Cold war politics reinforced this
view. Western (or Eastern) governments were willing to provide
assistance and arms to help strengthen the ISFs of regimes which,

whatever their other merits, were perceived as bastions against
communist (or pro-western) takeovers.
The predatory character of post-colonial politics, the ambitions of
executives to establish their continuing personal rule, and the
authoritarian impulses of political elites in power - these and other
factors - contributed to the establishment of many, increasingly
despotic civilian regimes, usually commanded by powerful Presidents
under the aegis of de jure or de facto one-party rule.
ISFs were essential to this political and constitutional transition.
During the '60s (and beyond) the size (and costs) of security forces in
most countries increased dramatically. The weakness or complicity of
legislative bodies and the repression of civil society facilitated
executive management of this expansion. So did the use of executive
decrees establishing "emergency powers" which extended the role of
ISFs in governance and politics. Often, too, other executive decrees
(frequently promulgated in secrecy), created new paramilitary and
secret surveillance units.
Thus, the orientation of ISFs (their
misconceived mission to support the security of the existing regime)
and the assumed constitutional prerogatives of the executive to
establish and control them, enabled their steady development as
institutions of authoritarian rule and increasingly, to the "lawless"
3
enforcement of a widening range of security objectives.'
A price was often paid for this growing involvement of ISFs,
notably the army, in political affairs. They, too, we are told, became
politicized - a term used to denote many different impulses, depending
on the context: for example, demands for better pay and perqs; an
enhanced awareness of ethnicity in politics; a desire for a bigger share
of the spoils of office and corrupt activities; or, conversely, a professed
12 See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) (the need for political
stability);- Luckham, supra note 7 on foreign "aid" to "strengthen" the military and police in African
countries.
13See H. Kwasi Premph, A New Jurisprudencefor Africa, 10 .. OF DEMOCRACY (No. 13) 135 (1999)
for a critique of African "judiciaries" which have "served as passive instruments of authoritarian rule" by
failing to appreciate the judicial role in a constitutional democracy and by establishing an "illiberal"
"constitutional jurisprudence" which condones the "supremacy of the executive" to determine what must
be done to preserve the "security of the state."
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desire to cleanse the Augean stables; a desire to impose some ideology
on the state - some form of radical populism or socialism, or,
conversely, some kind of anti-socialist regime; or simply a desire to4
seize power for self-aggrandizement - or, some combination of these.'
By the mid-'70s, most of Africa was ruled by the barrel of a gun by military regimes or by civilian leaders who depended on ISFs to
maintain their power. 15 Some of the consequences of this kind of rule
have been surveyed in various ways' 6 and some are made painfully
apparent by papers herein.
Created to secure "security," ISFs have in fact often become the
primary sources of civil insecurity: the longer they have ruled
(whether overtly or as the indispensable instrument of an authoritarian
"civilian" regime), the more uncertain becomes the security of persons
and property and the long-term stability of the state; the more
repression - and sometimes terror - are substituted for law as the means
of governing, the more prisons and burial grounds have become
populated with increasing numbers of innocent victims of illegal
detention, physical abuse and torture and disappearances; and the more
important it becomes to settle accounts for these abuses when
liberation finally occurs. The more brutality becomes the ordinary
method of criminal law enforcement, the more violent crime becomes
a new feature of social life. Prolonged rule by emergency decrees
which, in effect, treat fundamental rights with contempt, immunize
police and marginalize courts and silence dissent may well have even
longer-term consequences: the experience of gradually building
workable democratic, and rule of law, institutions is lost;
discrimination, bad governance and corruption become more
widespread; the economy fails; internal displacement, diaspora and
"brain drain" ensue; ethnic tensions are exacerbated and the prospect
of civil conflict looms; political and economic reconstruction become
more costly and difficult.
Moreover, the ISFs of a despotic regime often continue to exist
after its collapse; nor will they, mutatis mutandi, become organs of
14

5

See Luckham, supra note 7.
RUTH FIRST, THE BARREL OF AGUN: POLITICAL POWER INAFRICA AND MILITARY COuPS (1970).
socio-economic costs of military rule in Africa have never been comprehensively assessed

26 The

and probably cannot be. A number of consequences are discussed and quantified in Luckham, supra note

7.
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xvii

rule of law just because a new constitution prescribes democracy and
human rights. Rather, if these aspirations are to become rooted, ISFs
must first be reconstructed in fundamental ways.
B. The Structure and Governance of ISFs Today.
Using the elements of legal structure noted above as a framework,
participants in the Addis seminar were asked to describe and analyze
the law establishing the organization, functions, and the governance of
ISFs in their countries. Their reports suggest that, with the notable
exception of post-apartheid South Africa, very little law exists which
is addressed to these subjects. Conversely, the initial attempts in
reconstituted South Africa to establish an unprecedented, extensive
rule of law for the governance of that country's ISFs seem to
underscore the need to take this field of constitutional law more
seriously.
The lawless character of the governance of ISFs often begins with
the constitutional failure to define with care the very raison d'etre,
discrete roles and fundamental obligations of these organs of
government. The preservation of security of the state is often said to
be their purpose. As one survey notes: "the assumption prevails that it
is the state which soldiers and policemen are there to defend" but in
this calculus both the concept of "security" and "the state" are illdefined at best. 17 Thus, Abdullai An-Na'im's report notes how some
Addis participants simply assumed that preserving the state's security
is the overriding mission of ISFs, and this mission inevitably conflicts
with the goals of democratic constitutionalism. But the task, of course,
is to ask: what does "security" of "the state" really mean? Why and
how should this goal be pursued? If a rule of law to promote human
development, universal rights and democratic institutions and
processes are prescribed as the paramount constitutional goals of the
state, then, presumably, every officer and organ of government must
be obligated, first and foremost, to respect and protect the
constitutional order establishing those goals; and specific ISF duties
(e.g. to understand, value and protect guaranteed rights and the
constitutional authority of civil officers and organs) can be articulated,
17

See Luckham, supra note 7 at 22.
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and the entire system of their governance can be oriented toward these
roles in obedience to the constitutional mandate.
Location of constitutional powers to create, empower, regulate,
finance and control the very existence of all ISFs is also important. As
noted, it has too often been assumed that these are essentially
executive prerogatives; and, certainly, it would appear that legislative
organs, so often dominated by the executive, have seldom exercised
these powers. At a conference composed largely of military officers
from West African countries, the idea that elected legislators could
debate determine and control their army's budget came as a great
surprise to most. Nevertheless, constitutions can explicitly separate
these plenary powers to create, finance and control ISFs from the
executive's power to command them; and they can be exercised
pursuant to transparent legislative processes - for example, by
requiring continuing public oversight, open debate on the need for,
size and costs of each ISF unit, and by relating
their security roles to
8
other national goals and budgetary priorities.1
The processes of recruiting ISF personnel have seldom been
explicitly regulated by law, yet their composition in terms of gender,
geography, and ethnicity is, surely, a matter of great importance.
While positions in the police may, often, be nominally open to
women, reports in this volume (and others) suggest that the problems
of retention, promotion and empowerment within the police are
routinely neglected if not deliberately ignored. A review of literature
of African armies reports that most (if not all) are bastions of male
power; not only are women excluded from significant roles, but this
discriminatory exclusion reinforces their general subordination in the
political system.19 Thus ISF recruitment practices reflect a flagrant
disregard of the UN Women's Convention (CEDAW) which has been
ratified by most African states.
Further, it is said that most African ISFs are "driven by ethnic and
regional factionalism." Their composition is controlled by the ruling
18See Professor William Foltz's able report entitled Overview of the [Bujumbura] Conference, in
Buiumbura Conference on Democratization in Africae The Role of the Military 19 (African-American
Institute 1993. The World Bank has repeatedly deplored the high ration of "defense" expenditures to
total public expenditure in Sub-Sahara Africa. See e.g. World Bank, Sub-Sa arn Africa
From Crisis to
Sustainable Growth (1989) at 167-68. See also, Luckham, supra note 7 at 59.
" Luckham, supra note 7 at 22.
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regime and reflects its ethnic base; and excluded, suspect ethnic
groups are often marked for surveillance. 20 At the Bujumbora
international conference on the "Role of the Military in
Democratization," the army officer participants recognized that
removal of ethnic biases (in terms of composition) was "one of the
biggest [present] challenges" - calling for a wholly new body of
"recruitment 1 procedures" which are "public, equitable and
2
transparent.",
At the Addis seminar much emphasis was laid on training - as both
a cause of the lawless behavior of ISFs and the most important
potential cure for it.
There is surprisingly little literature which examines this thesis
22
with care, but an interesting article in the NAIROBI LAW MONTHLY
describes the indoctrination, from initiation into service through
formative experiences, of a Kenya police officer. It describes a period
of "Rambo-type" basic training, with emphasis on physical and martial
arts, unquestioning obedience and repeated drill on the legal powers of
police to use force. In this transitional period, the officer came to see
many members of civil society more as targets than as the
beneficiaries of policing: the marginalized poor, beggars, street boys,
rebellious youth, political "mobs," "insolent" students, "arrogant"
intellectuals and hostile politicians all became "enemies." So did all
those suspected of any serious crime. Indeed, the trainee soon learns
that the police are almost universally feared and despised.
"It is an indoctrination that totally removes [him] from his society"
and creates a "we vs. them" perception. 23 Receiving little instruction
in forensics and the science of organized criminal investigation, the
officer learns that coerced confessions and trespassory searches are
normal methods of investigation. Thus, the use of various forms of
violence - or the threat of it - against suspect people is a primary theme
of his acculturation.
The conditions of work, low pay, rigid discipline and the constant
threat of summary dismissal also contribute to stress, and a harsh
outlook. But the new recruit also learns that "the political system
'0Id. at23.
21Foltz, supra note 18 at 112-13.
2 Paul Mwangi, Police Brutality, NAIROBi LAW MONTHLY No. 49 (JULY 1993) 10-14.
2 Id. at 11.
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offers immunity" from citizen complaints of brutality and corruption
in return for his obedience to superiors. Indeed, corrupt practices are
often initiated and made "customary" by civilians who seek particular
favors and immunities for themselves. Thus, receiving these rewards
becomes part of the "system," a practice sanctioned by "custom".
Human rights training can obviously do little to counteract this
kind of indoctrination unless it is related to other changes in the whole
system of recruitment, training and governance. If reform is the goal,
human rights and anti-corruption training must be seen as one basic
element of a much larger reform effort directed towards the basic
reorientation and reconstruction of ISFs: training must be integrally
related to a reformulation of a unit's basic mission, to strict
comprehensive codes of conduct, to inculcating an appreciation of the
social value of protecting human rights and the sovereignty of the
constitutional order. Further training and codes of conduct will only
be effective if they are demonstrably tied to incentives and sanctions;
to criteria for promotion and, conversely, to grounds for discipline.
Such systems do not now exist. Codes of conduct, modeled on the
UN code for Law Enforcement officers, are absent even though
African governments have regularly supported UN Resolutions calling
for such codes. Discipline, rigid in some respects, is lax in regard to
other abuses of power. It has been said of Kenya: "The government...
has used the police to enforce its will on the people in exchange [for]
... [police] immunity from prosecution for misconduct." 24 Papers
herein and other reports suggest that a similar tacit understanding
exists in many countries.
Command responsibilities within ISFs appear to be structured
hierarchically, whereby duties and authority are delegated in straight
lines downward to particular operational units which are expected to
carry out assigned tasks, and if this is done, no questions will then be
asked by superiors on how it was done. There is often no serious
effort to create an inspectorate unit with comprehensive, global powers
and duties to monitor all units and all officers in the several chains of
command. Superior officers are seldom held accountable for abuses
perpetrated at lower levels.
Officers who attempt to institute

7A

Id. at 14.

GUEST EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
unwelcome reforms may face risks25 of transfer or worse. "Whistleblowers" are regarded as "traitors.
Country reports herein portray little if any legislative oversight of
abuses and little vigorous monitoring by independent commissions
adequately empowered to investigate allegations of abuse. In theory,
in anglophonic countries, the courts can provide habeas corpus and tort
remedies to citizens whose rights are violated. But these remedies
may be circumscribed in many ways: by the terms of executive
decrees establishing emergency or martial rule, by liberal
interpretation of police "privileges" and official "immunities," by well
known barriers which deter the access of poor people to the courts, by
burdens of proof needed to overcome organized lying and
"stonewalling" by the police, by the aggressive hostility of
governments to citizen allegations of police abuse, by unexplained but
flagrant police failures to obey court orders. Two particularly
important measures to empower courts seem undeveloped: provision
for "standing" enabling concerned groups to bring class actions to
redress systemic abuses, and provisions enabling courts to require
police units to initiate institutional reforms within ISF units in order to
remedy systemic abuses. Country studies of possible law reforms to
enhance judicial powers to regulate policing behavior are notably
lacking.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF LAW
The Addis participants generally agreed on the need to
establish a new body of principles requiring restructuring of ISFs. In
general terms, if not in all specifics, they agreed that the principles set
out in the draft Code of Universal Principles27should be incorporated
into the constitutional orders of African states.
25Id.
26CC Kwasi Premph's essay supra, note 13. Compare the power exercised by courts in India to
remedy systemic abuses - and the procedures adopted by the Supreme Court to enable poor and illiterate
victims of abuse to seek such remedies. See Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action
Litigation in the Supreme Court of India in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES - 1985: DEVELOPING LEGAL
REsouRcEs WrrH THE THIRD WORLD POOR.
2 See also the "Report" of the Uganda "Commission of Inquiry" into "Violations of Human Rights"
during the period 1962 to liberation. Its Recommendations, published in 3 EAST AFRICAN JOURNAL OF
PEACE AND HUMAN RIos 140 (1966) are discussed in the concluding paper in this volume; in many
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Of course there will be critics or skeptics of this emphasis on
law. Naysayers may argue that it is useless to attempt to legislate
reformed governance unless changes in political culture and behavior
first occur - notably changes in the behavior of political elites,
including those in ISFs. They may also point out that the process of
reconstituting African states is seldom a tabula rasa situation. Rather
that process is usually dominated by an interim, "liberation regime"
which, while rhetorically committed to democratization, is also quite
determined to establish its ongoing power; hence new liberation
regimes may well be unwilling to surrender too much control over the
very forces which have, historically, been used entrench the political
hegemony of the rulers, of the moment. Thus, it is unlikely that any
regime in power, even one which professes respect for rights, will
allow adoption - or implementation - of the principles proposed by the
draft code unless powerful pressures are applied by both civil society
and the international community. Moreover, the prospects for
mobilizing these pressures are diminished where the state and civil
society are so disconnected, where the state is so autonomous,
autocratic and unaccountable, and civil society so disempowered and
lacking unity, where the state and its people are not an organic unit.
However it is precisely because of this disempowering gap
between state and people that so many states in Sub-Sahara Africa
have failed in their essential mission - the provision of meaningful
security, law and essential services; the creation of Political and legal
environments which enable "human development.",28 The existence of
"failed states" in Africa has become not only a subject of much
scholarly discourse, but a source of growing awareness, in political
circles, that the crisis plaguing the region is political, not simply
respects the legislative and constitutional measures proposed reflect the principles proposed by the Draft
Code.
28"Human development" is used here as a term of art, as it now is in development circles, notably in
UNDP publications, particularly its annual Human Development Renort. "Human development" connotes
a holistic concept of "development for, by and of people," focusing on such interrelated objectives as
poverty alleviation with emphasis on enhanced participation, civic capacitation and empowerment; the
integration of human rights objectives into all development policies and programs; the initiation of
democraticized and "good" governance in all spheres which affect people; affirmative efforts to redress
gender discrimination and address the needs of women and excluded groups - and the creation or reform,
of many governmental institutions and processes to achieve these ends. Arguably, "human development"
is now a mandatory obligation of states imposed by the UN Declaration on the Right to Development of
1986 and numerous other international instruments. See James C.N. Paul, The United Nations and the
Creation of an International Law of Development, 36 HARVARD INT'L LAW J,307 (1995).
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economic; and the reconstitution of states in both political and legal
terms is a pre-condition to long term economic rehabilitation.
The international community - acting through regional and
global intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations - has a
very real interest in addressing these issues and facilitating struggles to
reconstitute states in ways which will integrate their governance with
the interdependent goals of "human development," "human rights,"
"democratization" and an African-oriented rule of law tailored to these
purposes.
ISFs have critically important roles to play in creating
conditions essential for human development and democratization: the
establishment of more effective security for persons and property (a
condition now sadly lacking in many communities thanks to the
degradation of the police); the alleviation of communal hostilities; the
promotion of effective political participation including facilitation of
public assemblies; the administration of fair elections; the enforcement
of "good" and "accountable" governance - and respect for human
rights. Needed is a new model structuring ISFs, one which relates
their tasks to essential goals of the state - and an articulation of thenew
kind of rule of law necessary to implement these goals.
These themes are more fully developed in the concluding chapter
of this volume.

